constraint. However, when the economy has a signi…cant fraction of overcon…dent agents, the incentive compatibility constraint no longer binds. 6 Compulsory insurance is equivalent to a transfer of wealth from low-risk to high-risk agents.
The incentive compatibility constraint does not bind in equilibrium because overcon…dent agents cannot be screened from low-risk agents. These agents share the same beliefs about their risk and so make identical decisions. In addition, we assume that insurance companies cannot directly observe agents'beliefs. Hence, the higher the fraction of overcon…dent agents in the economy, the higher the average risk of the pool of low-risk and overcon…dent agents, and the higher the price that insurance …rms must o¤er to avoid negative pro…ts. At high prices, these contracts become unattractive to high-risk agents. For instance, consider the extreme case with the fraction of low-risk agents (relative to the fraction of overcon…dent agents) is small. The insurance price for low-risk and overcon…dent agents is close to the insurance price for high-risk agents. Therefore, low-risk agents are better o¤ purchasing small amounts of insurance and are hurt by compulsory insurance.
Our basic result extends beyond compulsory insurance. When the fraction of overcon…-dent agents is signi…cant, budget-balanced government intervention cannot weakly improve the welfare of both high-risk and low-risk agents over the laissez-faire equilibrium of our model, unless it changes the fraction of biased agents in the economy. This result also extends beyond overcon…dence and still holds if we replace the assumption of a signi…cant fraction of overcon…dent agents with the weaker assumption of a signi…cant fraction of biased agents that can either be overcon…dent or undercon…dent. Finally, we show that policies that directly reduce overcon…dence in the economy may bene…t low-risk agents without harming high-risk agents. In the context of driving insurance, such policies materialize in voluntary training programs designed to help drivers improve their self-assessment skills.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model. Section II provides a graphical description of the equilibrium. Section III presents our main result informally.
Section IV contains additional policy results. Section V concludes. The formal analysis is laid out in a web appendix.
Related Literature Our paper is related to two branches of behavioral economics. The …rst branch studies market interactions between sophisticated …rms and biased consumers.
Stefano DellaVigna and Ulricke Malmendier (2004), Glenn Ellison (2005) and Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson (2005) study models where consumers may have naive beliefs, overlook add-on prices, or underestimate the chance of being subject to hidden fees. They …nd that in competitive markets, naive consumers may be exploited to the advantage of sophisticated consumers.
Unlike these models, our naive, overcon…dent agents cannot be separated from low-risk agents because their beliefs are the same. This entails higher insurance prices and an ef…ciency loss, not only distributive e¤ects. Ran Spiegler (2005) …nds an e¢ ciency loss in a market where consumers have a bounded ability to infer quality by sampling goods. Unlike our work, his emphasis is on equilibrium characterization, rather than policy analysis.
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The second related branch of behavioral economics studies the e¤ects of behavioral biases.
Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole (2002) and Botond Koszegi (2000) show that overcon…-dent agents may strategically ignore information. Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole (2003) study incentives to manipulate self-con…dence. Muhamet Yildiz (2003) . The amount 1 is the premium, 1 + 2 is the insurance coverage, and
is the price of a unit of insurance. We assume that 1 0; 2 0: individuals cannot take on more risk through an insurance contract. Each agent's risk is the probability p that the accident occurs, which can either be high
Conditional on all observable variables, there are three types of agents in the economy. Figure 2 . The incentive compatibility constraint no longer binds. To see this, let + be the intersection of the zero-pro…t line LO = 0 with the indi¤erence curve I H passing through H . Note that the indi¤erence curve of low-risk agents passing through + is steeper than the zero-pro…t line LO = 0 (in contrast, in Figure 1 it was ‡atter). Hence, + is no longer an equilibrium because any contract lying to the right of + between the indi¤erence curve I L and the zero-pro…t line LO = 0 would make strictly positive pro…ts. 10 The equilibrium contract for low risk and overcon…-dent agents, denoted by LO ; is determined by the tangency point of the indi¤erence curve I L on the zero-pro…t line LO = 0. Under regularity conditions, low-risk and overcon…dent agents'utilities decrease in : 11 By revealed preferences, low-risk agents'utilities are higher than high-risk agents'utilities which are higher than overcon…dent agents'utilities. low-risk and overcon…dent agents believe that the insurance contracts they are o¤ered are so unfavorable that they do not insure.
III. Compulsory Insurance
Compulsory Insurance without Overcon…dence A compulsory insurance requirement is a contract = ( 1 ; 2 ) > 0 that makes zero pro…ts if imposed uniformly across all agents. Each agent is required to buy contract and is free to buy additional insurance ( ) on top of : Formally, let p LH (1 ) p H + p L be the average probability of accident in the economy. Any compulsory insurance contract that keeps the budget balanced must lie on the zero-pro…t line LH = 0; i.e., (1 p LH ) 1 p LH 2 = 0:
In the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model, the introduction of compulsory insurance yields a Pareto improvement, as long as the fraction of low-risk individuals is above a threshold. To see this, note that the adoption of is equivalent to a change of endowment from
. Given this, the remainder of the analysis is qualita-tively unchanged. High-risk agents'contracts H ( ) fully insure. Low-risk agents'contracts L ( ) lies in the intersection of the zero-pro…t line L ( ) = 0 and the indi¤erence curve I H passing through H ( ) (see Figure 3 ).
Compulsory insurance makes high-risk individuals better o¤ because the terms of the compulsory contract are more favorable than the terms of the equilibrium contract H :
Low-risk agents pay the cost of being pooled together with high-risk individuals on the contract : However, compulsory insurance relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint imposed by the high-risk subscribers. This can be seen in Figure 3 , as the compulsory insurance contract shifts the indi¤erence curve I H up. When the fraction of high-risk subscribers is su¢ ciently small, the relaxation of incentive compatibility is large enough to make low-risk agents better o¤.
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Compulsory Insurance with Overcon…dence Now consider the case in which the fraction of overcon…dent agents in the economy is intermediate or large, i.e. > 1 ( ).
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Because the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind in equilibrium, result 1 below shows that the introduction of compulsory insurance cannot improve all agents'welfare over the laissez-faire equilibrium. Speci…cally, it makes low-risk individuals worse o¤. Unlike the case that abstracts from overcon…dence, compulsory insurance now induces a transfer of wealth from low-risk agents to high-risk agents without any bene…cial e¤ect on incentive compatibility constraints.
Result 1 Suppose that the fraction of overcon…dent agents in the economy is either intermediate or large (i.e., > 1 ( )): Then, any compulsory insurance contract > 0 makes low risk agents strictly worse o¤.
This result may be appreciated by inspecting 
IV. Further Policy Results
General Policies We now show that the logic of Result 1 extends to any incentivecompatible budget-balanced policy (paternalistic or not). We de…ne these policies formally in the appendix. In contrast to the case without overcon…dence, government intervention cannot improve all agents'welfare over the equilibrium outcome of this model.
Result 2
Suppose that the fraction of overcon…dent agents in the economy is either intermediate or large (i.e., > 1 ( )): Then, no incentive-compatible budget-balanced policy can weakly improve the welfare of both low-and high-risk agents over the competitive equilibrium.
The intuition for Result 2 is as follows. 14 The equilibrium contract H strictly maximizes high-risk agents' utility among contracts on the zero pro…t line H : Because the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding, the equilibrium contract LO strictly maximizes lowrisk agents utility among contracts on the zero-pro…t line LO = 0 (see Figure 4) . Low-risk and overcon…dent agents cannot be separated by any incentive-compatible policy because they have the same beliefs. Budget-balanced government intervention cannot simultaneously assign an allocation to high-risk agents above the zero-pro…t line H = 0 and an allocation to low-risk agents above the line LO = 0: So, it cannot strictly increase the welfare of either high-risk or low risk agents without making one of the two types strictly worse o¤.
Undercon…dence We now enrich our basic model by introducing undercon…dent agents who perceive that their risk is high, when, in fact, it is low. We let their fraction in the economy be 0; and we denote the fraction of unbiased high-risk agents by = 1 :
The average risk of high-risk and undercon…dent agents is:
We assume that p HU is larger than the average risk of low-risk and overcon…dent agents p LO :
In the unique (locally) competitive equilibrium, the contract HU is purchased by highrisk and undercon…dent agents, and the contract LO by low-risk and overcon…dent agents.
Incentive compatibility ensures that high-risk and undercon…dent agents do not prefer
The main di¤erence with respect to the equilibrium in Section II is that high-risk and undercon…dent agents overinsure:
These agents are less risky, on average, then they perceive to be: p HU < p H : Hence, they are willing to overinsure at the competitive price P HU = p HU of contract HU :
Result 3, below, shows that our analysis extends beyond overcon…dence. Speci…cally, compulsory insurance fails to make all agents in our model better o¤, provided that there are su¢ ciently many biased agents that can either be overcon…dent or undercon…dent.
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Formally, result 3 holds when the fraction of overcon…dent agents is larger than a threshold ( ; ) de…ned in the appendix. Because the function ( ; ) decreases in ; the fraction is larger than ( ; ) ( ( ; ) may be zero) whenever the fraction of undercon…dent agents is larger than a threshold ( ; ) :
Result 3 Unless both fractions of overcon…dent and undercon…dent agents and are small (i.e. ( ; )), the government cannot weakly improve the welfare of both low-and highrisk agents upon the perfectly competitive equilibrium HU ; LO by means of any incentivecompatible budget-balanced policy (including compulsory insurance). 
V. Conclusion
In the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets with asymmetric information, compulsory insurance may make all agents better o¤, provided that agents are fully rational. We build on this basic model of insurance, but we assume that a signi…cant fraction of agents in the economy do not accurately access actual risks. In addition, we assume that insurance companies cannot directly observe agents'beliefs. Under these assumptions, compulsory insurance fails to make all agents better o¤ because it is detrimental to lowrisk agents. Our results do not deliver unquali…ed support for laissez-faire policies. Rather they show that while behavioral biases may support paternalistic policies in simple decisiontheoretic models, they may also weaken asymmetric information rationales for government intervention in fully-developed market models.
We hope that these results will motivate additional studies on the interactions between di¤erent reasons for government intervention in the economy and also on the functioning of markets when agents are less than fully rational. price stickiness in a model with loss-averse consumers. 8 To simplify the exposition, we focus on the case in which the di¤erence between low risk and high risk is not too small relative to the damage d: That is, we assume that
9 In a general equilibrium model, Pradeep K. Dubey and John G. Geanakoplos (2002) show the existence of an equilibrium that approximates the locally-competitive equilibrium. John G. Riley (1979) shows that the locally-competitive equilibrium coincides with a "reactive" equilibrium where …rms, before introducing new contracts, anticipate that competitors will react by o¤ering new contracts, if they generate positive pro…ts. Charles A. Wilson (1977) proposes an alternative reactive equilibrium where loss-making contracts are removed as a reaction to newly-introduced contracts.
10 Any such contract makes strictly positive pro…ts because it is purchased only by low-risk and overcon…dent agents and its price is larger than P LO ; as lies below the zero-pro…t line (1985)). In this equilibrium, insurers are not pro…t maximizers: They sell lossmaking contracts to high-risk agents, subsidized with pro…t-making contracts sold to low-risk agents. 13 If < 1 ( ), the analysis is analogous to the case without overcon…dence.
14 Result 2 subsumes result 1 because compulsory insurance is a special case of incentivecompatible budget-balanced government policy. Thus, result 1 is demonstrated as a corollary of result 2. 15 In our companion paper, we further explore the robustness of our results and show that they still hold (with proper quali…cations) when there are more than two levels of risk in the economy. 16 At the time they choose to join the training program, none of these agents believe that they will improve their self-assessment skill. They join only because^ LO is cheaper than the contract LO that they would be o¤ered if they did not attend the program. 17 In our companion paper, we show that if participation in self-assessment training programs were compulsory, it would reduce the utility of high-risk agents. Equilibrium Analysis. This section formalizes the graphical equilibrium analysis of Section II. Before presenting the analysis, we formally de…ne locally-competitive equilibrium.
A locally-competitive equilibrium is a set of contracts A such that when each contract 2 A is available in the market, (i) no contract 2 A makes strictly negative expected pro…ts, and (ii) there is an " > 0 such that any contract 0 for which jj 0 jj < " for any 2 A; would not make strictly positive pro…ts.
The …rst step in the equilibrium analysis shows that overcon…dent and low-risk agents pool together, and together they separate from high-risk agents. For future reference, we de…ne the marginal rate of substitution associated to contract and risk p; as:
Proposition .1 In the unique locally-competitive equilibrium, high-risk individuals choose
Low-risk and overcon…dent individuals choose the contract LO that solves the maximization problem
subject to the non-negativity constraint = 0; and to the incentive compatibility and zeropro…t conditions:
As long as LO > 0; the insurance price P LO equals p LO and increases in :
Proof.
Step respectively, let the average risk be: 
Since U is twice di¤erentiable, there is an " > 0 small enough
all type L and O agents but not by type H agents. Hence, " (1; m) yields expected
, which is strictly bigger than ( ) = 0 for " small enough because p > p LO : Because " (1; m) is a local pro…table deviation, cannot be an equilibrium contract.
Because p p LO for any equilibrium contract such that L + O > 0; it follows that
Because ( ) = 0 for all equilibrium contracts, and U 00 < 0; there are therefore at most two equilibrium contracts ; ; with > ; such that L + O > 0 and L + O > 0: Because type H must separate from types L and O , and U is concave and twice di¤erentiable, type H purchase a single di¤erent contract H with probability one.
Step 2. There exists a unique locally-competitive equilibrium, characterized in the statement of Proposition .1.
By
Step 1, if a locally-competitive equilibrium exists, it is a pair of distinct contracts 
= 0 and
not admit any local pro…table deviations : Because U is twice di¤erentiable and U 00 < 0;
A solution to the LO -maximization problem exists and is unique because U 00 < 0 and
Finally, we note that, because p H > p L ; dp LO =d < 0 and dp LO =d > 0: By condition (.3), the price
2 ) equals p LO ; and hence it increases in .
The equilibrium characterization is completed in the Proposition .2 below, which also reports our comparative statics results, and determines perfect-competitive equilibrium existence. For any parameter constellation (W; d; p H ; p L ) ; the thresholds 1 and 2 ; functions of ; uniquely solve respectively:
where the variables and are embedded in the expression
Proposition .2 The incentive compatibility condition (.2) binds if and only if < 1 ( ) :
For 1 ( ) < < 2 ( ) ; the equilibrium contract LO satis…es the tangency condition Proof. Let = ( 1 ; 2 ) be the contract pinned down by condition (.3) and by the binding incentive compatibility condition (.2). Di¤erentiating these equations, we obtain:
( .7) where the quantity
Because dp LO =d < 0 and dp LO =d > 0; we obtain that d 1 =d > 0; d 1 =d < 0; d 2 =d > 0; and d 2 =d < 0:
we obtain: dM ( ; p L ) =d > 0: Because d =dp LO < 0 and dp LO =d > 0; we have shown that for any ; there is a unique threshold 1 pinned down by system (.4) and that M ( ; p L ) > (<)(1 p LO )=p LO if and only if > (<) 1 ( ) : Because d =d < 0; d =dp LO < 0 and dp LO =d < 0, 1 is strictly increasing in by the implicit function theorem.
Suppose that < 1 ( ) ; and that, by contradiction, condition (.2) does not bind in equilibrium:
and both and LO satisfy condition (.3), it must be that < LO and hence that Since dp LO =d > 0; for any there is a unique threshold 2 ( ) such that M (0; p L ) > (< )(1 p LO )=p LO if and only if > (<) 2 ( ) : When > 2 ( ) ; the constraint 0 binds in equilibrium, whereas when 1 ( ) < < 2 ( ) ; the equilibrium contract LO is pinned down by condition (.3) and by the tangency condition (.6). Since dp LO =d < 0; the function 2 is increasing in : and obtain:
This derivative is positive because LO ) decreases in and increases in because dp LO =d > 0; dp LO =d < 0 and 
(1 p L )a 1 ; by Proposition .2. Hence, the allocation cannot be better than LO for agents
Result 1 immediately follows from the proof of Result 2.
Proof of Result 1. For any compulsory insurance contract > 0, the associ-
is budget balanced and incentive compatible. Furthermore,
The proof of Result 2 thus concludes that, for > 1 ( ) ;
In order to prove Result 3, we …rst formally describe the equilibrium of our model with overcon…dent and undercon…dent agents.
Proposition . Proof. For any contract ; let
where U is the probability that U purchases :
Arguments in the proof of Proposition . 
Hence dM ( ; p L ) =d > 0: Letting = (1 p LO )=p LO ; because d =dp LO < 0 and dp LO =d = 0; and because dM ( ; p L ) =d > 0; d =dp LO < 0 and dp LO =d > 0; decreases in by the implicit function theorem.
We conclude by proving result 4.
Proof of Result 4.
For 
